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"Taking of a blood sample from a DUI suspect 
against his will for testing is lawful when 
the amount of blood taken is minimal, the 
procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, 
or pain, the blood is withdrawn in a hospital 
environment according to accepted medical 
practices, and there is probable cause to 
believe the suspect was driving while 
intoxicated." 
James A.K. Roper 
Judge Greenville County 
Family Court 
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BLOOD SAmPLE ... 
TAKEN WITHOUT CONSENT 
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FORCIBLE TAKING OF BLOOD SAMPLE 
Schmerber v. California (16 Led 2d 908), decided 
by the United States Supreme Court in 1966, is the 
basic authority for the proposition that a blood 
sample may be taken from a suspect without his 
consent .•. or even against his will ••• when there is 
probable cause to believe the suspect guilty of DUI 
.•. if the sample is taken in clinical circumstances 
and there is little or no danger to the suspect as 
a result of the sample-taking. 
Schmerber was involved in an authomobile 
accident and taken directly to the emergency room of 
a hospital. Law enforcement officers, having reason 
to believe that Schmerber had been driving the car 
under the influence, asked him to give a blood 
sample for testing. After talking with his lawyer, 
Schmerber refused ..• whereupon the officer instructed 
the attending physician to withdraw a blood sample 
for testing. The doctor complied and Schmerber was 
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convicted of DUI upon evidence of sufficient alcohol 
in his blood. 
Schmerber appealed, arguing that it was unlawful 
for a blood sample to be taken from his body against 
his will. His appeal reached the United States 
Supreme Court. That Court held the sample-taking in 
the circumstances to have been lawful and sustained 
the conviction. Language of the Court: 
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BLOOD TAKEN IN REASONABLE MANNER 
" ..• the record shows that the test was performed 
in a reasonable manner. Petitioner's blood was 
taken by a physician in a hospital environment 
according to accepted medical practices. We are thus 
not presented with the serious questions which would 
arise if a search involving use of medical technique, 
even out of the most ruidmentary sort, where by made 
other than medical personnel or in other than a 
medical environment- for example, if it were 
administered by police in the privacy of the station-
house. To tolerate searches under these conditions 
might be to invite an unjustified element of personal 
risk of infection and pain. 
"We thus conclude that the present record shows 
no violation of petitioner's right under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to be free of unreasonable 
searches and seizures." 
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COURT'S WARNING ABOUT 
POSSIBLE UNLAWFUL METHODS 
''It bears repeating, however, that we reach 
this judgment only on the facts of the present 
record. The integrity of an individual's person 
is a cherished value of our society. That we today 
hold that the Constitution does not forbid the 
States minor intrusions into an individual's body 
under stringently limited conditions in no way 
indicates that it permits more substantial 
intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions." 
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INVENTORY SEARCH OF 
IMPOUNDED VEHICLE EXTENDED 
(US v. Balanow, 528 F2d 923) 
ImPOUNDED VEHICLE ... 
Indiana State Troopers on routine patrol duty 
INVENTORY SEARCH EXTENDED 
observed a vehicle weaving from lane to lane in a 
prohibited manner. They stopped it to investigate 
and ascertained that the operator was driving under 
suspension. Balanow, the driver, was placed under 
arrest and his car impounded. Another officer, 
'\ f~") arriving on the scene to offer help, was handed the 
~ keys to Balanow's car and asked to make an inventory 
search. The second officer complied, including a 
search of the locked trunk without consent of the 
owner. There was no probable cause to believe 
contraband was in the trunk. 
The searching officer found a sawed-off shotgun 
in the trunk. Balanow was convicted of the fire-
arms violation. He appealed, arguing unlawful 
search of the locked trunk and seizure of the shotgun. 
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Holding of the United States Court of Appeals, 
Seventh Circuit, January 19, 1976: 
Verdict of guilty upheld. The search of the 
locked trunk without the consent of the owner, and 
without probable cause, was lawful as part of an 
'inventory search'. Language: 
"The ultimate test of the legality of the search 
and seizure is the reasonableness of the police 
officer's conduct. In this case it was unassailable. 
The Indiana State Police had probable cause to arrest 
defendant for his improper change of lanes and 
driving while his license was suspended. Because of 
the de~eh!ant's suspended driver's license, it would 
have been improper to allow him to continue to drive 
his car, and Indiana law permitted the State Police 
to protect the vehicle by removing it from the road-
way. Id. Furthermore, the Indiana State Police 
Training and Personnel Bulletin (April 1, 1960) 
authorized the impoundment of the car. The officer's 
i 
/ 
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decision to seize the car was not unreasonable. 
"Under normal state procedure, defendant's car 
was searched at the time of impounding. The police 
had a right to inventory the contents of the 
impounded car." 
EDITOR 1 S NOTE: 
Although the decision of any US Court of Appeals 
is weighty, this decision is not binding as the law 
of South Carolina's Federal Circuit (Fourth Circuit). 
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the South 
Carolina Supreme Court has held that a search of 
locked parts of an impounded vehicle without a search 
warrant, probable cause to suspect contraband, or the 
consent of the person in charge, is permitted as part 
of an inventory search of a vehicle. 
Particular attention is directed also to the 
fact that the Court in Balanow is talking about an 
impounded vehicle ••• not one where the driver is not 
placed under custodial arrest. 
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LICENSE AND REGISTRATION CHECK ... 
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RANDOM STOP OF VEHICLE 
FOR LICENSE AND REGISTRATION CHECK 
(US v. Jenkins, 528 F2d 713) 
A New Mexico State Trooper made a random stop 
of a single vehicle on the highway for the purpose 
of driver license and registration check. There was 
no road block or other check-point procedure in 
operation. 
The suspect car was stolen and the operator, 
Jenkins, was driving with an expired driver license. 
Conviction and appeal followed. It was argued 
for Jenkins that the initial stop of the vehicle was 
unlawful because the license and registration check 
was nothing more than a 'pretext' to investigate 
other possible violations of law ••• and the officer 
had no probable cause to suspect any such violations. 
Facts recited by the Court: 
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"At the hearing on the motion to suppress, a 
patrolman for the New Mexico State Police testified 
that he made a random stop of a vehicle bearing 
California license plates on Interstate Highway 40 
just west of Tucumcari, New Mexico, for the purpose 
of making what he called a "routine registration 
check". The patrolman stated that prior to making 
the stop he had noticed nothing unusual or suspicious 
about the vehicle or the conduct of its driver, and 
that, as was his custom, on the day in question he 
made some fifteen to twenty random stops of a 
similar nature. The officer had noticed that the 
driver of the vehicle was a black male person and 
that there was a white male passenger in the car, 
and added that this had nothing to do with his 
decision to stop the vehicle." 
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The US Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the random stop of a vehicle for license and 
registration check was lawful in the circumstances 
..• and the conviction was upheld. 
EDITOR'S NOTE: 
It is important to note that all courts have 
held, when presented with the question, that the 
random stop of a vehicle for license and 
registration check is unlawful when done as a mere 
'pretext' to investigate for other violations. 
Thus, the officer's testimony in this case that he 
had stopped 15-20 other cars for the same purpose 
(license check) on the same day. If the court had 
found 'pretext' to have been the case, any evidence 
discovered as a result thereof would have been 
inadmissable 'fruit of the poison tree'. 
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FLEMING'S NOTEBOOK ..• Chapter 123 
TRAFFIC SUMMONS 
1976 ACT 
Act No.482, Acts of 1976, General Assembly of 
South Carolina, effective March 2, 1976, provides 
that a traffic offender may not be forced to trial 
in less than ten days following the date of arrest. 
When the uniform traffic ticket is issued, the date 
of trial must be shown as no less than ten days 
following the date of arrest. 
COUNTING DAYS 
In counting the days under the new act, the 
count starts on the day following the arrest. 
For example, when the arrest is on the 3rd of the 
month, the count would begin on the 4th. The lOth 
day would fall on the 13th day of the month .•• so, 
the 13th would be the earliest day on which the case 
could be set for trial. 
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When the lOth day falls on Sunday, it would 
then be set on the Monday following. Sundays are 
counted when they fall on 1st through the 9th days, 
but not when they fall on the lOth day. 
VOLUNTARY PLEA, TRIAL, OR FORFEITURE 
An offender may lawfully forfeit bail, enter a 
plea, or be tried before the lOth day if he consents 
to the earlier date. 
) 
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RULE OF THUMB 
(1) Date of trial shown on the uniform traffic 
ticket should never be less than ten (10) days 
following the date of arrest. When the lOth day 
falls on Sunday, the trial date would be no sooner 
than the 11th day. 
(2) When an offender volunteers to have his case 
disposed of earlier than the lOth day, it would be 
a good idea to have some signed statement to that 
effect on the back of the ticket. Example: 
"I consent to (bond forfeiture) (trial) 
(entry of plea of guilty) on this charge 
on the day of , 19 ______ _ II 
(offender's signature) 
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SENTENCING JUVENILES 
IN SERIOUS CASES 
(Golden v. State et al, SC, AprilS, 1976) 
Thertofore, there has been considerable doubt 
at to the sentence that could be imposed by a court 
on juvenile defendants (under age 17) convicted of 
more serious crimes, such as murder, rape, man-
slaughter et al. 
It has been assumed by many judges and attorneys 
that the maximum punishment possible was sentence 
to the Department of Youth Services until age 21, at 
which time release would be mandatory. See Section 
55-50.30, 1962 Code of Laws of South Carolina, as 
amended. 
The South Carolina Supreme Court has now held 
(Golden v. State et al) that a juvenile convicted in 
General Sessions Court for a serious offense may be 
sentenced by the presiding judge to a specific term 
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(21 years for rape in the Golden case), committed to 
the Department of Youth Services until 21, then 
transferred to the State Penitentiary or other adult 
facility for service of the remainder of the sentence. 
It is further held by the decision that in the case 
of juvenile defendants convicted in General Sessions 
Court, the judge may sentence the juvenile in either 
of two ways: 
(1) To a specific sentence, to be served in the 
Department of Youth Services until 21, then the 
remainder, if any, at an adult corrections facility. 
(2) To an indeterminate sentence in custody of the 
Department of Youth Services until age 21, or unless 
released sooner by the Department. Release at age 
21 would be mandatory. 
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In the Golden case, the rape defendant was 13 
at the time of sentence. He was sentenced in York 
County Court of General Sessions to 21 years, to be 
served in custody of the Board of Youth Services 
until 21, then to be transferred to the State 
Penitentiary for the remainder of the sentence. 
Less than a year later, the Board of Youth 
Services granted the defendant his conditional 
release, but cancelled the release order 11 days 
later upon learning that the judge who imposed the 
original sentence was preparing to enforce it by 
judicial action. 
The State Supreme Court held that the Board of 
Youth Services had no authority to grant a condition-
al release under the sentence imposed, and that it 
could only retain custody of the defendant until age 
21, then transfer him to the State Penitentiary for 
service of the remainder of the sentence. 
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